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In this paper we discuss the problems associated with a small remnant of seemingly non eradicable accidents in
contemporary aircraft landings and propose three autonomous agents whose task it is to jointly monitor the aircraft
and its flight crew.  Two of these agents will monitor the path of the aircraft, one armed with prior knowledge of
how planes tend to land at a particular airport, the other with the ability to extrapolate forward from the plane’s
current position in order to identify potential dangers.  The third agent will monitor the flight crew’s behavior for
potentially dangerous actions or inactions.  These three agents will act together to improve safety in the specific
process of landing the aircraft.  This paper focuses on the development of the third agent.
Introduction
No one would disagree that air travel, especially in
large airliners, has become extremely safe.  This has
been particularly apparent in the last few decades.  The
improvement in safety has largely been due to
technological innovation in the design of on-board
systems and the widespread development and
implementation of flight crew training in team
management and group effectiveness.  Crew resource
management (CRM) training has been used by airlines
all aver the world in an effort to increase the safety of
airline operations.  Thatcher (1997, 2000) has
suggested that CRM effectiveness could be increased
if CRM techniques were introduced much earlier in a
pilot’s training, at the ab-initio level.  This strategy is
currently being implemented at the University of South
Australia’s Aviation Academy.  However, given all
these advances in aviation safety there remains a
statistically constant, and somewhat stubborn, remnant
of air crashes which are seemingly not eradicable.  Of
these accidents, worldwide, Helmreich and Foushee,
(1993) have suggested that 70% are due to flight crew
actions or in some case inactions.  This is despite the
fact that pilots are extremely technically competent
and well trained in CRM.   Pilots undergo regular line
checks in both the human factors and technical areas of
line operation.  Within airlines flight crews are highly
trained to operate in the modern cockpit environment.
There is consensus that CRM has increased aviation
safety.   This  raises  the  question  as  to  why  these
accidents happen and, perhaps even more disturbingly,
why they continue to happen, albeit at a very low level
of incidence.
In this paper we discuss the problem of continuing
accidents in contemporary aircraft approach-and-
landings and propose three intelligent software agents
whose task it is to jointly monitor the aircraft and its
flight crew (Thatcher et al 2004a, 2004b).
The trio of intelligent agents within the proposed
paradigm will be organized as follows:  Two agents
will be physically situated onboard the aircraft.  The
remaining agent will be physically situated at the
destination aerodrome.  The agent positioned at the
airport will monitor the flight path of the aircraft as it
commences its approach.  This agent (the Anomaly
Detection Agent) will have knowledge of typical
aircraft approach profiles for that particular aerodrome.
The other two agents within the paradigm will be
situated onboard the aircraft.  One of these agents
(the Prediction Agent) will have the ability to predict
the airplane’s future position using its current three
dimensional position and vertical and horizontal
velocity variables.  The predicted future position of
the aircraft will be used to identify potential terrain
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threats.  The other agent (the Pattern Matching
Agent) also situated onboard the aircraft will monitor
the flight crew’s behavior and determine if the flight
crew are losing situation awareness on the landing
approach.  This research is in its early stages but the
communication and interaction between these three
agents is considered essential to the research and
future research will concentrate on this area.
This paper will outline the proposed knowledge-
based intelligent landing support paradigm with
particular emphasis on the third agent, the Pattern
Matching agent.
Controlled Flight into Terrain and Approach and
Landing Accidents
A controlled flight into terrain accident or CFIT
accident can be defined as an accident involving
impact with the ground or water by an airworthy
aircraft where the flight crew was unaware of the
proximity of the ground or water.  The majority of
CFIT accidents occur on approach and landing and can
also be classified as approach and landing accidents
(ALA’s).  However, some CFIT accidents occur in the
take off, climb and cruise segments of flight.
Why do such accidents happen and, perhaps more
disturbingly, why do they continue to happen?
A Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) report concluded
that from 1979 through 1991 CFIT and approach-
and-landing accidents (ALAs) accounted for 80% of
the fatalities in commercial transport-aircraft
accidents (Flight Safety Foundation, 2001)   The FSF
Approach-and-landing Accident Reduction Task
Force Report (Khatwa & Helmreich, 1999)
concluded that the two primary causal factors for
such accidents were “omission of
action/inappropriate action” and “loss of positional
awareness in the air”.
It seems that most of the CFIT accidents are due to a
momentary loss of concentration or awareness during
which the flight crew did not consciously notice that a
necessary event did not occur, or that an adverse event
did occur.  Subsequent events are perceived by the
flight crew in terms of their current mental model, or
awareness, of the situation.  Thus it is acknowledged
that an event can only be perceived within the
framework of the existing paradigm.  This is termed
situated cognition (Lintern, 1995).   Data will continue
to be perceived and restructured in terms of the
existing mental model until an event happens which
forces an unsettling recognition that the pilot’s mental
model of the world (weltanschauung) is actually false.
If this happens too late on in a critical process, the
result can be an adverse event.  This is termed loss of
situation awareness.
Situation awareness is “the perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time
and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and
the projection of their status in the near future.”
(Endsley (1987; 1988)).
One solution to the problem is to increase the level of
automation onboard the aircraft.  However,
automation has associated human factors problems
and may lead to a decrease in situation awareness
amongst the flight crew.  In terms of situation
awareness and automation on the flight deck Endsley
and Strauch (1997) maintain that “despite their high
reliability, accurate flight path control, and flexible
display of critical aircraft related information,
automated flight management systems can actually
decrease” a flight crew’s “awareness of parameters
critical to flight path control through out-of-the-loop
performance decrements, over-reliance on
automation, and poor human monitoring
capabilities.”  Further, pilots can in some respects
configure the Flight Management System to present a
view of the physical world which supports their
interpretation of the world or their mental model of
the current operating environment.  Weiner (1988)
describes reports of pilots creating flight paths to
wrong locations which went undetected and resulted
in collision with a mountain.
We will investigate the critical period associated with
ALA’s and CFIT accidents when the primary causal
factors occur.
Existing Terrain Awareness Technologies
In 1974 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
mandated that all heavy airliners be fitted with a
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) or
Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS).
The early GPWS used information from the aircraft’s
radar altimeter and air data computer to determine the
aircraft’s vertical distance from the terrain below.
The system was somewhat limited because it only
perceived in real time the vertical separation between
the aircraft and the ground directly below.  The Flight
Safety Foundation (FSF) CFIT Task Force
recommended that early model GPWS be replaced
by Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS) or Terrain Awareness
and Warning Systems (TAWS) which have a
predictive terrain hazard warning function. (Khatwa
& Helmreich ,1999).
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In response to the report the FAA mandated in 2001
that all heavy transport aircraft be fitted with EGPWS
and further,  that  all  turbine  aircraft  with  10  or  more
passenger seats be fitted with EGPWS from 2003.
For example, the circumstances which lead to the loss
of situation awareness by the flight crew of American
Airlines (AA) Boeing 757 that struck a mountain
while on descent for a landing at Cali,  Colombia, on
December 20, 1995 have been investigated (Endsley
and Strauch, 1997).  Even though the GPWS onboard
the aircraft functioned correctly, somewhat
surprisingly, it did not help the pilots avoid the
collision with high terrain.  The reason for this was
the operational design parameters of the GPWS
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
The EGPWS compares the aircraft’s position and
altitude derived from the Flight Management and Air
Data computers with a 20MB terrain database.  In the
terrain database the majority of the Earth’s surface is
reduced to a grid of 9x9 km squares.   Each square is
given a height index.   In the vicinity of airports the
grid resolution is increased to squares of 400m x
400m.  The height index and the aircraft’s predicted 3
dimensional position 20 to 60 seconds into the future
are compared to see if any conflict exists.  If it does the
EGPWS displays an alert or warning to the flight crew.
Other than to initially alert the pilots of “TERRAIN”
up to 40-60 s before impact or warn the pilots to
“PULL UP” up to 20-30 s before impact it does not
offer any other solution to the potential problem.
This research aims to extend the EGPWS by using
three intelligent software agents which can plot a
course around, or over, possible conflicting terrain
and present a solution to the pilot on the cockpit
display system or as input to the autopilot.
Intelligent Agents
Wooldridge (2002) describes an intelligent software
agent  as  a  program  that  performs  a  specific  task  on
behalf of a user, independently or with little guidance. It
performs tasks, tailored to a user’s needs with/without
humans  or  other  agents  telling  it  what  to  do.  To
accomplish these tasks, it should possess the
characteristics such as learning, cooperation, reasoning
and intelligence. By analogy, a software agent mimics
the role of an intelligent, dedicated and competent
personal assistant. In this application we propose
developing three agents, one ground based and the other
two aircraft based, which will aid pilots during the
critical approach and landing phase.  In effect the two
onboard agents will act as another flight crew member.
The Anomaly Detection Agent
The anomaly detection agent will be situated on the
ground  in  the  air  traffic  controller  centre.   Each
airport will have its own anomaly detection agent and
each agent will be monitored by the local ATC.
A typical airport has many safe landings each day.
These are recorded by the air traffic control authorities
but not used for automatic sensing of dangerous
landings: this is the task of the air traffic controller
who has ultimate authority in advising the pilots of
potential conflict with terrain or other aircraft.  Similar
to a human which operates within the cognitive,
affective and behavioral domains a software agent can
be said to have beliefs, desires and intentions (BDI
model).  We propose creating an agent using the BDI
model (Thatcher et al, 2004a) whose:
• Beliefs are in two major areas: firstly it retains a
knowledge of all previously successful landings at
that airport. This database itself can be hand-
crafted by the (human) air traffic controllers since
there may have been some successful landings in
the past which, despite being successful, followed
a pattern of activity which the air traffic
controllers deem to be not good practice. Secondly
the agent will have beliefs centered on the current
landing – the aircraft’s height, horizontal distance
from landing strip, speed, heading, lateral distance
from  landing  strip,  type  of  aircraft,  weather
conditions and any other factors which affect
landing performance.
• Desires are that the aircraft lands safely.
• Intentions  are  to  do  nothing  unless  the  plane  is
deemed to be deviating from the historical norm.
If such a deviation is noted, the agent informs the
air traffic controller who has responsibility for the
plane and the pilot himself.
This agent will use anomaly detection as its basic
method. Consideration was given to a neural network
anomaly detector (e.g. Kohonen’s anomaly detector
(Kohonen, 1988)) but because it is critical that the
warning be given clearly identifying why the warning
has been raised, an expert system approach will be
used for this application. Thus a series of “if … then
…  “  rules  will  be  created  from  the  database  of  past
successful landings and the current flight’s data
compared with the rules associated with this database.
The Prediction Agent
Two agents will be situated onboard the aircraft: the
Prediction agent will be monitoring the aircraft’s
position, heading etc and the Pattern Matching Agent
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(next section) will monitor the pilot’s behavior.  The
Prediction agent is essentially an improved version of
the existing EGPWS software described above.  The
improvements are intended to give a more
“intelligent” solution and earlier warning of potential
problems than the existing software.
The Prediction Agent has Beliefs about;
• the aircraft’s position, heading, speed, rate of
descent etc.,
• the landing strip’s position,
• weather conditions,
• surrounding ground topology, particularly where
dangers are to be found,
• the pilot. This may be controversial to the Pilots’
Unions but one must concede that different pilots
will tackle tasks differently.
Similarly to the last agent, this agent desires that the
plane be landed safely.  It  again has the intention of
doing nothing unless the patterns it is monitoring
match potentially dangerous conditions.  It might be
thought that the Prediction Agent is duplicating the
work done by the last agent (Anomaly Detection
Agent) but this agent will monitor the descent in a
very different manner.  The Anomaly Detection
Agent will use a database of previous landings to that
particular airport to ensure that the current landing is
bona fide and within the parameters of a safe
approach.  The Prediction Agent will take its
knowledge of current position, speed, etc. and
knowledge of the local geography to extrapolate the
plane’s position 5 minutes ahead in order to predict
dangerous conditions before they actually occur.
This prediction will be derived using an artificial
neural network trained with the standard radial basis
function methods (Haykin, 1998).  A full description
of radial basis function networks is given in (Haykin,
1998).  The Prediction Agent will be designed as
follows:  the terrain database derived from the
onboard database or from topographical information
of the area will be used to generate a grid comprising
i=n  squares.   Each  square  i  at  any  time  t  will  be
assigned variables such as temperature (T(i,t)),
atmospheric pressure (P(i,t)), wind component
(W(i,t)), terrain height (TH(i,t)), terrain gradient
(∆TH(i,t)), cloud height (CH(i,t)), visability (V(i,t)),
and the current aircraft performance variables speed
(v(i,t)), altitude (a(i,t)), track (tr(i,t)), and rate of
climb (dA/dt(i,t)).  A neural network will be trained
with this test data until an optimal solution is reached
based  on  the  performance  of  the  system  using  the
output measures such as accuracy, sensitivity, false
positive and false negative ratios.
If the prediction suggests danger, it is intended that
the Prediction Agent will contact the Anomaly
Detection Agent and the Pattern Matching Agent.
The Anomaly Detection Agent can assert that the
current landing pattern is within the recognized safe
zone but if it deemed to be close to the edges of this
zone, an alert will be issued to the pilot and the air
traffic controller.
The alert to the Pattern Matching Agent will be
discussed in the next section.
The Pattern Matching Agent
The Pattern Matching Agent will also be based on the
BDI model and has beliefs about:
• The recent past behavior of the pilot
• Typical behaviors of the current pilot
• Behaviors which are typical of pilots losing
situational awareness, performing an inappropriate
action or not performing an appropriate action.
Again its desires are that the plane lands safely and
its intentions are to do nothing unless it matches the
pilot’s current behavior with dangerous practice.
The Pattern Matching Agent will be equipped with a
database of behaviors which are suggestive of, or a
prelude  to,  the  loss  of  situation  awareness.   In  other
words, this agent will fulfill the role of a dedicated
professional who, sitting in the cockpit, would
identify the pilot’s actions (or inactions) as worthy of
concern.  This pattern matching is accomplished by a
simple Associative Artificial Neural Network
(Haykin, 1998) which matches approximately
existing patterns of behavior to those in the database.
There is a body of research that indicates that pattern
matching together with schema and mental models
facilitates the development of situation awareness
(Kaempf et al, 1993).  Endsley and Bolstad (1994)
found evidence that fighter pilots with higher levels
of SA had better pattern matching skills.   Kaempf et
al (1996) discovered that pattern matching to
situation prototypes accounted for 87% of decisions
by tactical commanders.
This research aims to develop a database of typical
pilot behaviors or actions during an approach.
Further  data  will  be  included  in  the  database  to
describe rate of descent, speed, flap setting, speed
brake armed, altitude etc.  Perhaps this database
could be described as a mental model of a descent? It
might be difficult to envisage a software agent having
a mental model of a typical approach.  But we should
consider that a software agent (Pattern Matching
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Agent) could have a database of typical pilot
behaviors that could be compared with the actual
behaviors.   How  big  the  database  has  to  be,  for  the
agent to be considered as processing a mental model
is  a  question  for  future  research.   However,  for  this
agent to function in the cockpit and communicate
potential hazardous behaviors, be they actions or
inactions, the agent must develop SA within its
beliefs, desires and intentions model.
All three agents will have the ability to communicate
with each other at all times.  To this extent each agent
will have beliefs about the other two.  When the
Pattern Matching Agent received a warning from
either of the others, it would respond with a degree of
confidence about the pilot’s current situation
awareness.  We currently intend the Pattern Matching
Agent as a reinforcement mechanism for the other two
agents.  At this stage in the research we do not
envisage this agent overruling warnings communicated
by the other two.  Further, the combination of the three
agents would achieve the three levels of SA (Endsley,
2000)) Level 1 – Perception, Level 2 - Comprehension
and Level 3- Projection.
Conclusion
We have identified the specific process of approach-
and-landing accidents as one which might
successfully be augmented with intelligent agent
technology.  We thus have proposed three agents:
1. The first will be situated on the ground and will
have a knowledge of typical landings at the current
airport.
2. The second will be situated onboard the aircraft
and will be attempting to use the aircraft’s current
position and heading and knowledge of the local
geography to predict potential dangers.
3. The third will be also onboard the aircraft and will
be monitoring the behavior of the flight crew for
actions indicative of the loss of situation
awareness.
This research is in its early stages but we consider the
interaction between these three agents to be central to
the research and future research will concentrate on
communication between the three agents.
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